On India's “Sharp Power” Over Nepal

Article can be found here: http://setopati.net/setopati-blog/116332

In setopati.net, Kundan Kumar Jha writes of the concept of “sharp power” as it applies to Nepal; sharp power being a “tactic” using techniques of “pressure, bullying and deception." This criticism of India's approach to Nepal favors only a Nepali narrative which portrays Nepal as an independent entity which has the capacity to reveal what India is doing, thinking, feeling and deciding about Nepali politics. This kind of analysis of Indian power and “tactic” is very tricky if we consider the Indian perspective on Nepal for a moment, because for India Nepal is firstly not an object to be dominated, but a remote entity, one which it does not know about, and also, an entity that does not know about India. Even this graphic concept of “sharp power” will most likely not be a damning criticism of India, but something which simply demonstrates that we do not know Indian power and tactics too well.

The Indian state is powerful, but faces a challenge in the form of remoteness of certain places from its development projects. Indeed, even within territorial India this seems to be an enduring problem for it. When the Indian state, or any developmental gesture coming from an Indian entity at the “center” of Indian power, acts to fund a project or solve a dispute, its first appearance makes a lasting mark, because it comes with an awareness that it is remote from most places, it has developed without the participation of the periphery; it is too self-conscious as a new thing, a marvel, when it does its work; its place of speaking is from the billboards on the roads. Nepal also features in Indian halls of power as a remote place, and primarily not as an independent and resistive nation-state. Thus, the way we think of Indian power has to change: it is not going to impose a harmful and deceptive tactic as the final expression of its power and force, but it will be present in the billboards of Nepal, its leaders' posters will speak from the walls of bus-stops and so on. Other than that, the visit of Indian political figures to Nepal is the fullest extent of what Indian power over Nepal will look like. There is thus no need for a graphic concept like “sharp power" to support a narrative that tries to show Indian power in Nepal as intensifying in an observable way.

There is of course an ongoing attempt to fight this remoteness between India and Nepal, but largely from the Indian side. When a political figure from India visits Nepal, it is in an attempt to show that Nepal is not remote, that it is familiar, that the flight from Delhi is comfortable and takes hardly more than an hour. There is a comfort demonstrated, as if Indians have thought about Nepal as an entity whose very core identity will be defined and constructed in relation to their own. This knowing of Nepal is not reliant on a cultural or religious affinity, but from a direct physical proximity, from the steady growth of Indian involvement in Nepal as its remoteness is tackled bit by bit. But when a Nepali political figure visits India, there is no attempt at fighting remoteness for the sake of development and other benefits; instead, Nepalis think they are either submitting to India or resisting it regarding India's stance on whatever the current political events occurring in Nepal, as if the concept of “independence” applies very strictly even between neighboring countries.

On PM Oli's Choosing of a Finance Minister

Prime Minister Oli has chosen a finance minister and an industry, commerce and supplies minister (source: setopati.net) today. The importance and unpredictability associated with finance and commerce would suggest that the ministers that go into ministries related to finance and commerce are themselves predictable, orderly and such. This could be a reflection of personal character, but also the current status and aspirations of the political party that they represent. Is this rationale apparent in PM Oli's choices today? That the finance ministry itself won't “dissolve” is evidence of a basic order in Nepali politics, but it may not be evidence of a system wide order and predictability, only that some “elements” in the political system are, or behave, in an orderly and predictable manner.

Furthermore, a study on the history of the finance ministry and other Nepali ministries is needed to evaluate their endurance; given that there is no prominent existing administrative element that actively sustains and manages the division of ministries on a day to day basis, the endurance of a ministry seems dependent on how it originated: What events led to its origin? Can we even say that some ministry like the finance ministry had an “origin” which is fully the result of Nepali politics, when its main task seems to be to act as a stable and predictable element in the wider  financial system?

What is the endurance of the ministries, given that they arose it seems not from a day to day delaying of their end, but from an elaborate planned project, which means that their endurance is projected, for five, ten or fifteen years, given the measurement of their capacity to withstand resistance or challenges? In an unpredictable field like finance, a field which needs as much stability and predictability as possible, is it the case that the ending of the finance ministry is extremely accurately defined?